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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 16639

CECIL EARL BROOKS and
JAMES CHARLES EDWARD GOOD,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from convictions of Aggravated
Assault in violation of Sections 76-5-102, 76-5-103 and
76-2-202, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), and subsequent sentences.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellants were each charged with two counts of
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, and were tried
by a jury on July 16-19, 1979 in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for

~alt

Lake County, State of Utah, the

Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, presiding.
each appellant guilty on both counts.

The jury found

Judgment on the
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verdicts was entered and each appellant was sentenced to
an indeterminate sentence of zero to five years in the
Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order from this Court affirming
the verdicts of the jury and the judgments and sentences of
the court below.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent generally agrees with appellant's
Statement of the Facts as far as it goes, with certain
exceptions noted below.
Prior to trial, on July 9, 1979, Judge Leary
convened a hearing on the State's motion to introduce at
trial the tapes of the preliminary hearing (R. 279-566).
Detective Foster, South Salt Lake Police, testified
at"that hearing that both victims had indicated they were
going to stay for the trial (R. 285); that Vinson promised
he would notify Foster of any change of address (R. 287);
that as soon as Foster had any idea of a Bakersfield,
California address for Storie, he contacted the Bakersfield
police and the local bus lines in a vain attempt to locate
Storie (R. 288-291) ; that he contacted all known relatives
of Storie and left messages for Storie to contact Foster
(R. 291-294) ; that he contacted likely hangouts in Fresno

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
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and Sacramento all to no avail (R. 293) •
Foster further testified that Vinson did contact
him regarding Vinson's change of address (R. 295) and that
after discovering that Vinson had left, he checked with
the Assistance Payments Division and Salt Lake Rescue
Mission

, and searched Pioneer Park (R. 296-97).

stated that he left word with Roper

He also

Yards personnel to notify

him if they saw the witnesses (R. 297).
Detective Foster also stated that at the time of
him last personal contacts with either witness he had no
idea of when the trial would occur and that he had followed
up every lead he received (R. 328).
Wendy Hufnagel, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
and Prosecutor in this case, stated that she had directed
Detective Foster to follow any leads he had in attempting
to"locate the witnesses (R. 330).
The following additional testimony was received
at trial:
Larry Creason, a trainyard supervisor at Roper
Yards, led the group of employees which first encountered
the appellants after they had fled the crime scene.

He

testified that Good admitted the appellants were involved
in the "fracas;" that Brooks said the cut throat (of Vinson)
resulted from Good hitting the victim with the "pickax;"
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and that Good stated that both victims should have been
dead (R. 615-616, 633).

Mr. Creason further testified

that both appellants indicated they wanted to turn themselves
in rather than run (R. 617).

He also testified that Brooks'

hand wound did not appear to be fresh and was not bleeding

(R. 636, 638-639).
Paul Midgely, a carman at Roper Yards was also
with the group that stopped the appellants.

He testified

that appellants admitted being in the fight; that they stated
they didn't want to run for the rest of their lives; and
that they were surprised that the victims were not dead (R. 6li
Scott Broussard, special agent for the railroad, testified
that neither of the appellants appeared to be injured, but
that Brooks did have blood on his hands {R. 700-701).
Dr. Mathews,

an emergency-room physician from

I
I

Holy Cross Hospital who treated Vinson, testified that Vinson's I
neck wound was life-threatening {R. 829).

Both Dr. Mathews

and Dr. Callister, an emergency-room physician from Valley
West Hospital who treated Storie, testified to the effect
that some of both victims' wounds were caused by a sharp
instrument and others by a blunt instrument (R. 824-840).
Dr. Mccloskey, University of Utah pathologist,
testified that almost all of the articles found at the
scene of the crime were stained with blood of a type

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,-4may contain errors.

consistent with either or both of the victims, but with
neither of the appellants (R. 849-888).
Officer Crelly, South Salt Lake Police, testified
that during the ride to the station following Brooks' arrest,
Brooks stated he had hurt his hand that morning or the day
before on a piece of railroad equipment (R. 999-1000).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES
GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTIONS OF UTAH
AND THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT VIOLATED
BY THE ADMISSION AT TRIAL OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING TAPES.
The fundamental issue in this case is whether
appellants were denied their "right to confront the witnesses
I

I'I

against [them]" as guaranteed by Article I, Section 12 of
the Utah Constitution and by the Sixth Amendment to the
Unrted States Constitution, by the admission at trial of
the victims' tape-recorded preliminary hearing testimony.
In other words, does the exception to the Hearsay Rule
provided in Rule 63(3) (b) (ii), Utah Rules of Evidence, allowing
the prior recorded testimony of an unavailable witness to be
admitted as substantive evidence at a subsequent trial
necessarily violate constitutional confrontation rights?
Respondent submits that the answer must be in the negative
based on the standards articulated by this Court and the
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United States Supreme Court.
The recent case of Ohio v. Roberts,

~-

u.s.

~'

100 s.ct. 2531 (1980), reiterates the two-step analysis
necessary to determine the acceptability of prior testimony
evidence in relation to confrontation considerations.

First,'

the witness must be unavailable; second, the testimony must
I

have been recorded under circumstances manifesting sufficientl

I

indicia of reliability.
A

THE PROSECUTION MET ITS BURDEN OF
DEMONSTRATING THE UNAVAILABILITY OF
THE WITNESSES.
The threshold requirement for admitting at trial
prior recorded testimony is that the party seeking to
introduce that testimony has the burden of establishing
the unavailability of the witness whose declarations are
sought to be admitted.

Rule 63 (3) (b), Utah Rules of Evidence

In Roberts, the Court stated:
The basic litmus of Sixth Amendment
unavailability is established: 11 [A]
witness is not 'unavailable' for purposes of
the • • • exception to the confrontation
requirement unless the prosecutorial
authorities have made a good-faith effort
to obtain his presence at trial. 11 Barber v.
Page, 390 u.s. at 724-725, 88 s.ct., at 1322
(emphasis added). • • [citations omitted].
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Although it might be said that the
Court's prior cases provide no further
refinement of this statement of the rule,
certain general propositions safely emerge.
The law does not require the doing of a
futile act.
Thus, if no possibility of
procuring the witness exists (as, for
example, the witness' intervening death),
"good faith" demands nothing of the
prosecution. But if there is a possiblity,
albeit remote, that affirmative measures
might produce the declarant, the obligation
of good faith may demand their effectuation.
"The lengths to which the prosecution must
go to produce a witness • • • is a question
of reasonableness." California v. Green,
399 u.s., at 189, n. 22, 90 s.ct., at 1951
(concurring opinion, citing Barber v. Page,
supra).
The ultimate question is whether
the witness is unavailable despite goodfaith efforts undertaken prior to trial to
locate and present that witness.
100 s.ct. at 2543 (emphasis in original).
The Court noted that the extent of the prosecution's
efforts in that case included only talking to the witness'
mother and issuing five subpoenas to the mother's address,
knowing that the witness was not there.

The Court then

stated:
Given these facts, the prosecution did
not breach its duty of good-faith effort.
To be sure, the prosecutor might have tried
to locate by telephone the San Francisco social
worker with whom Mrs. Isaacs had spoken many
months before and might have undertaken other
steps ip an effort to find Anita.
One, in
hindsight, may always think of other things.
Nevertheless, the great improbability that
such efforts would have resulted in locating
the witness, and would have led to her production
at trial, neutralizes any intimation that a
concept of reasonableness required their
execution.
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The Court went on to compare the factual situatiot,
in Roberts with the prior cases of Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719 (1968), and Mancusi v. State, 408 U.S. 204 (1972).1
In Barber, a witness was held not to be unavailable when
he was incarcerated in a federal prison and procedures exis
to secure the witness' presence at trial.
In Mancusi, the unavailable witness had
his Swedish homeland.

The Court held that he was

unavailable because, even though his whereabouts were

kno~,

no procedures existed to compel his attendance at the second
trial.
The Roberts Court then concluded that where the
witness' "whereabouts were not known and there was no assur
that she would be found in a place from which she could be
forced to return • • • the prosecution carried its burden of
demonstrating that [the witness] was constitutionally
unavailable for • • • trial."

100 s.ct. at 2544-45.

This Court in State v. Oniskor, 29 Utah 2d 395,

51!

P.2d 929 (1973), recognized that the burden on the State was
to show "it had made a good-faith effort to secure the
attendance of the witness and had been unsuccessful."
P. 2d at 931.

510

Rule 62 (7) {e), Utah Rules of Evidence, defines

"unavailable as a witness" to include situations where the
witness is "absent from the place of hearing because the
proponent of his statement does not know and with

,I

diligence~

unable
to ascertain
his provided
whereabouts."
ponsored by the been
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In Gallegos v. Turner, Utah, 526 P.2d 1128
(1974), the admission at the second trial of an unavailable
witness' prior testimony was upheld.

In defining the

extent of the State's good-faith due-diligence burden,
this Court rejected any mechanical application of a
prescribed set of steps to be taken in attempting to
locate witnesses:
It is true that many and various things
might be done in attempting to locate a
witness.
Neither those listed in [Poe v.
Turner, 353 F.Supp. 672 (D. Utah 1972)]
nor, we assume, any other case, would be all
inclusive or exclusive.
The requirement is
simply that the trial court be persuaded that
the party (the State) has acted in good
faith and with reasonable diligence and is
unable to locate and bring the witness to the
trial.
The rule of review is comparable to
that in most situations wherein it is the
prerogative of the trial judge to make the
determination.
That is: he is allowed
considerable latitude of discretion; and that
his ruling will not be reversed in the absence
of a showing of clear abuse thereof.
526 P.2d at 1129-30 (footnote omitted).
Poe v. Turner, 353 F.Supp. 672 (D. Utah 1972), was
a habeas proceeding concerned with the efforts of the State
to locate missing witnesses.

The witnesses in that case were

not transients, had former residence addresses and previous
places of employment.

They apparently possessed driver's

licenses and owned vehicles registered in their names.

-9-

Further,
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the witness' relatives were all contacted to no avail.
There were also reports that one of the witnesses may
have been living in Chicago or New York, and that another
may have been working for the City of Las Vegas and
later, for a railroad company in the Midwest.

Signficantly,

none of those reports were followed up by the State.
In concluding that the State had made a good faith effort
to locate the witnesses, the court stated that those reports
were not indications of sufficient
substance as to be included within the
necessary purview of a good-faith search.
It was not necessary for the state to follow
every single lead to its ultimate end.
353 F.Supp. at 676.
In the case at bar, the trial court was satisfied
that the State had made a good faith effort to locate the
witnesses (R.361).

As noted in Gallegos v. Turner, supra,'

trial court's determination of unavailability will be upheld
absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.

Appellants

cite numerous cases purporting to demonstrate that on the
facts here, the trial court abused that discretion.
Respondent submits that all of those cases are distinguishab!
Appellants liken the present case to Fresneda v.
Alaska, 483 P.2d 1011 (1971).

s·

However, in that case, the

missing witness had definitely joined the Army and like in
Barber v. Page, supra, official procedures existed to locate

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
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and return the missing witness.

483 P.2d at 1018, fn. 26.

Further, the lack of diligence was held to be harmless
error where other evidence was sufficient to uphold the
conviction.
Appellants also cite People v. Horn, 36 Cal.Rptr.
903 (1964), to show the importance of the time lapse between
knowledge of a witness' absence and the start of the search to
locate him.

The court did indeed recognize that the time

lapse was important, but then pointed out that that was only
one factor to be considered.

The prior cooperation of the

witnesses was also a factor to consider.
Similarly in the present case, both the witnesses
had indicated their intention to stay and Vinson had
promised to notify Detective Foster of any change of
address.

Respondent suggests that it was not unreasonable

to. assume that either or both witnesses would return for
the trial based not only on their prior statements, but
also on the apparent easy availability of support and
lodging from Assistance Payments and St. Mary's Home.
People v. Starr, 89 Mich.App. 342, 280 N.W.2d
519 (1979), is cited by appellants as requiring that all
specific leads and reasonable alternatives be pursued.
The missing witness in that case was a potential co-defendant
and a local resident.

Further, as appellants recognize,

there were other individuals present at the incident and
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Respondent would agree that had other participants been
available in the present case and had any local officials
had familiarity with the witness' movements, those leads
should have been checked out.

Indeed, all other witnesses

to any of the events on the night of the assault were
produced at trial.

Further, all possible leads to the

witnesses' whereabouts were checked out up to and
including the beginning of trial.
The "most specific lead • • • not checked out
by the prosecutor" in People v. Mcintosh, 389 Mich. 82,
204 N.W.2d 135 (1973), which appellants cite, was the
distinct possiblity that the unavailable witness was in
a North Carolina prison whose authorities were never
contacted by the prosecution.

Suffice to say no such

specific lead existed in the present case.
Appellants cite State v. Greer, 27 Ariz.App.
197, 552 P. 2d 1212 (197 6) , to suggest that the prosecutor
in the instant case was negligent in failing to supervise
the efforts to locate the missing witnesses.

In the

~

case, there was a six month lag between knowing of the
witness' unavailability and the beginning of trial.

During

that six month period no effort at all was made to locate
the witness, including no checks with his employer, his
mother

or his sister-in-law.

Further, no attempt was

nsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Serv
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made to check any forwarding address from his address
at the time of the preliminary hearing.

The court favorably

cited Poe v. Turner, supra, for examples of the sorts Of
things that could be done to demonstrate good-faith
attempts to locate a missing witness.
The case of Peo;ele v. Rogers, 79 Ill.App.3d
745, 398 N.E.2d 1058 (1979), is inappropriately cited by
appellants.

In that case, the missing witness was one

of the co-defendants who had testified at the preliminary
hearing on behalf of herself and the other defendants as
to possible justification for the robbery.

The remaining

defendants attempted to introduce this absent defendant's
testimony at trial.

The defense made eight or ten phone

calls, had indeed contacted the witness-defendant two or
three times and was still unable to offer an explanation
fO'r her absence.

Respondent agrees that had any

telephone contact been made with the witnesses here, or
anyone who had a

reasonable idea as to their location,

the State would have had to do more.

However, no contacts

of that sort were made or ignored.
Appellants place heavy emphasis on the fact that no
subpoena

to Donald Storie was ever issued. They do not

suggest, however, where this subpoena could have been served.
The lack of importance of a worthless subpoena was recently
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discussed in People v. Forgason, 99 Cal.App.3d 361, 160
Cal.Rptr. 263 (1979).

There, the State was challenging

the good faith effort of the defense to secure unavailable
witnesses.

Although, as the court noted, the burden to

show good faith is considerably heavier on the prosecution
than on the defense, the value of a subpoena issued for a
known-to-be-unavailable witness is equally worthless:
[L]ittle, if any, importance will be
placed upon the pro forrna act of delivering
a subpoena "in a timely fashion to the
sheriff for service upon the missing witness,"
when the party is unable to suggest a place
where he may be served • • • And "'no good
could be accomplished by requiring that
an officer. • .make a pretense of looking
for the witness in a number of places where
he could not reasonably be expected to be
found. • • • '"
[A]n "idle" and "pro forrna" requirement
• • • accomplished "'no good'" and is manifestly
unreasonable.
160 Cal.Rptr. at 266-267 (citations omitted).
Appellants next assert that the State "had reason
to know that Vinson and Storie had no intention of remainin!
in Salt Lake for any extended time, especially since neither
had sought employment."

(App. Brief. at 27).

On the

contrary, as already demonstrated, the State did have
reasonable expectations that the witnesses would remain
for the trial.

Their failure to obtain employment would

seem more reasonably explainable on the basis of the seriou.
ness of the wounds inflicted by the appellants than on any

I

preconceived plans to leave town.
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Flores .v. People, Colo., 593 P.2d 316 (1978), cited
by appellants, is initially distinguishable from the instant
case on the basis that there it was indeed likely, four
months before trial, that the witness would be dead or
incapacitated by the time of trial.

Further, as will be

discussed below in Part B of Point I,

a preliminary

hearing in Colorado may not offer sufficient indicia of
reliability to justify admission of that testimony at
trial, and therefore a deposition may be the only
appropriate way to preserve testimony in that jurisdiction.
That preliminary hearing testimony in Utah is
sufficiently reliable generally, and clearly was in this
case, will be demonstrated below in Part B.

Suffice to

say here that the testimony of the witnesses was
adequately preserved via the preliminary hearing tapes.
Appellants question the lack of requiring
bonds or surety deposits from these witnesses pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-15-25 and 26 (repealed), in force at
the time.

Respondent suggests that the committing magistrate,

along with the State, had reasonable expectations that the
witnesses would appear for trial.

Thus, there was

insufficient reason to require a bond in this case.
Finally, appellants cite People v. Enriquez,
137 Cal.Rptr. 171, 561 P.2d 261 (1977), to suggest, once
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-15Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

more, the allegation that the State did not make a good
faith effort to locate the missing witnesses.

In that

case, the State offered no testimony on the issue of
due diligence, and the defense offered·testimony from
the witness' mother to the effect that she could have
located the witness but the prosecution made little,
if any, attempt to elicit the information from her.
The Court characterized the prosecution's efforts as
one of "casual indifference."
Respondent submits that instead of "casual
indifference" and the refusal to check reasonable leads,
the State's efforts in the present case more nearly
resemble the efforts made by the prosecution in State v.
Anderson, 42 Or.App. 29, 599 P.2d 1225 (1979), cited
favorably by appellants (App. Brief at 28).

The

witnesses in that case, like Vinson and Storie and
unlike the witness in Enriquez, were truly transient
and had no relations and few friends on the scene.
(Indeed, Vinson and Storie could fairly be said to have
had no contacts at all in the area, except for the
appellants themselves.)

The efforts made to locate those

witnesses in Anderson included only checking their last
known addresses, making a futile call to Los Angeles
based on a sketchy report that they had gone someplace
in that area, and in the case of one of the witnesses,
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As the Court put it:
The itinerant lifestyle of these
witnesses made it much more difficult to
track them down because they left few
tracks.
They maintained no permanent
employment, had no permanent residence
in the area and left no forwarding address.
599 P.2d at 1228.
Respondent submits that not only have appellants
failed to show that Judge Leary committed a clear abuse of
discretion in finding that the State made a good-faith
due-diligence effort to locate the missing witnesses, but
that any reasonable reading of the facts inexorably leads
to the conclusion that Vinson and Storie were constitutionally
"unavailable" at the time of trial.
B

THE PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY
WAS OBTAINED UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES
BEARING SUFFICIENT INDICIA OF
RELIABILITY TO BE ADMISSIBLE AT
TRIAL.
Appellants recognize early in their argument that
Ohio v. Roberts,

U.S.

, 100 s.ct. 2531 (1980), and

its precursors are adversely dispositive of the issue of the
reliability of the preliminary hearing tapes and the
propriety of

thei~

admission at trial once unavailability of

the witnesses has been demonstrated (App. Brief at 7 and 29).
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Appellants proceed, however, to ask this Court to declare
that either generally, preliminary hearing testimony is
so inherently unreliable as to render it inadmissible at
trial, or specifically, that the preliminary hearing
testimony in this case is so inherently unreliable as
to render it inadmissible.
Respondent initially agrees that Ohio v. Roberts,
supra, is indeed dispositive of the reliability issue.

While

reaffirming the fundamental importance of confrontation at
trial, the Court n,o:ted that it has
recognized that competing interests, if
"closely examined," Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 u.s., at 295, 93 s.ct., at 1045,
may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial. See Mattox v. United
States, 156 u.s., at 243, 15 s.ct.
at 340 ("general rules of law of this kind,
however beneficent in their operation and
valuable to the accused, must occasionally
give way to considerations of public policy
and the necessities of the case"). Significantly, every jurisdiction has a strong
interest in effective law enforcement, and
in the development and precise formulation
of the rules of evidence applicable in
criminal proceedings.
100 s.ct. at 2538.

The Court went on to set out the

necessary requirements for admitting prior testimony:
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In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not
present for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause normally requires a
showing that he is unavailable.
Even then,
his statement is admissible only if it bears
adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability
can be inferred without more in a case where the
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception.
100 s.ct. at 2539 (emphasis added).
In Roberts, the unavailable witness, Anita Isaacs,
was a friend of the defendant's who the defendant called as his
witness at the preliminary hearing in an attempt to show that
he had permission to use the credit cards and checks he was
convicted of stealing and forging.

Anita denied that assertion.

Defense counsel did not ask that she be declared hostile nor
that he be allowed to cross-examine

her.

At trial, Anita

was declared "unavailable" and her preliminary hearing
testimony was admitted over defendant's objections.
In upholding the trial court's admission of the
testimony, and reversing the Ohio supreme Court, the Court
refused to distinguish "preliminary hearing testimony previously
subjected to cross-examination from previously cross-examined
prior-trial testimony."

100 s.ct. at 2542.

The foundation had been laid long ago for the clear
holding in Roberts that no principled distinction exists between
cross-examined preliminary hearing testimony and trial
testimony.

As the Court stated in California v. Green, 399

U.S. 163, 90 S.Ct.

1930 (1970):
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This Court long ago held that
admitting the prior testimony of an
unavailable witness does not violate
the Confrontation Clause. Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 15 S.Ct. 337,
39 L.Ed. 409 (1895). That case involved
testimony given· at the defendant's first
trial by a witness who had died by the time
of the second trial, but we do not find
the instant preliminary hearing significantly
different from an actual trial to warrant
distinguishing the two cases for purposes
of the Confrontation Clause. Indeed, we
indicated as much in Pointer v. Texas, 380
u.s. 400, 407, 85 s.ct. 1065, 1069 (1965),
where we noted that "[t]he case before us would
be quite a different one had Phillips' statement
been taken at a full-fledged hearing at which
petitioner had been represented by counsel who
had been given a complete and adequate
opportunity to cross-examine." And in
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725-726, 88
s.ct. 1318, 1322 (1968), although noting that
the preliminary hearing is ordinarily a less
searching exploration into the merits of a
case than a trial, we recognized that "there
may be some justification for holding that
the opportunity for cross-examination of a
witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies
the demand of the confrontation clause where
the witness is shown to be actually unavailable
* * *." In the present case respondent's counsel
does not appear to have been significantly limited
in any way in the scope or nature of his crossexamination of the witness Porter at the preliminary hearing. If Porter had died or was
otherwise unavailable, the Confrontation Clause
would not have been violated by admitting his
testimony given at the preliminary hearing-the right of cross-examination then afforded
provides substantial compliance with the purposes
behind the confrontation requirement, as long as
the declarant's inability to give live testimony
is in no way the fault of the State.
399 U.S. at 165-166, 100 S. Ct. at 1939.

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
-20-by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

This Court has recently recognized that a preliminary
hearing in Utah affords criminal defendants adequate protection
of their right to confrontation.
P. 2d 778 (1980)
Brief at 16).

State v. Anderson, Utah, 612

(same case as "State v. Brackenbury," App.
In Anderson, this Court stated:

[T]he adversarial qualities of the
examination allow the defendant an
opportunity to attack the prosecution's
evidence and to present any affirmative
defenses. Although the hearing is not a
trial per se, it is not an ex parte
proceeding nor one-sided determination of
probable cause, and the accused is granted
a statutory right to cross-examine the
witnesses against him, and the right to
subpoena and present witnesses in his
defense.
Thus, the preliminary examination
is an adversarial proceeding in which
certain procedural safeguards are recognized
as necessary to guarantee the accused's
substantive right to a fair hearing.
612 P.2d at 783 (footnotes omitted).
The Anderson case was concerned with the admission
at the preliminary hearing of an absent witness' affidavit
to support a finding of probable cause.

In ruling that

confrontation rights demanded the witness' presence at the
hearing, it was said:
The adversarial nature of the preliminary
hearing is conducive to the imposition of
these procedural safeguards.
The application
of the right of cross-examination, and the
exclusion of certain out of court statements
at this stage of the criminal prosecution
insures essential protection of the defendant's
substantive rights.
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Specifically, the cross-examination of
witnesses presenting testimony against the
accused at the hearing provides a means of
attacking their credibility and thus the
substance of their testimony. In a proceeding
such as the preliminary examination, where the
credibility of the witnesses is an important
element in the determination of probable
cause, the recognition of a procedural right
of cross-examination is essential to the
preservation of a fair hearing.
612 P.2d at 786 (footnote omitted).

(Contrast Flores v. Peal

Colo, 593 P.2d 316 (1978), and People v. Smith, Colo, 597
P.2d 204 (1979), where the Colorado Supreme Court determined
that, unlike Utah, Colorado preliminary hearings are
severely limited in the protections provided to defendants.)
The Court's attention is called to the Transcript
of Preliminary Hearing (R.158-278).

Respondent submits that

not only were appellants given adequate opportunity to
cross-examine the two witnesses but that they took full
advantage of that opportunity.

Mr. Iwasaki, counsel for

appellant Brooks at the preliminary hearing and at trial,
thoroughly cross-examined the witness Storie.

Indeed,

the 38 pages of the transcript are replete with
appropriately hostile and argumentative questions designed
to break down the victim's story (R.172-210).

Ms. Pixton,

appellant Good's counsel at the hearing and at trial,
consumed 27· pages of transcript during her cross-examination
of Storie, similarly attempting to shake his story (R.210-

237). By comparison, the direct examination of Storie by M5·
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Hufnagel consists of only 11 pages (R.161-72).

The

cross-examination of the witness Vinson by Mr. Iwasaki
covers 21 pages of transcript (R.244-64), and by Ms.
Pixton, 11 pages (R.265-275).

Vinson's direct testimony

is contained in seven pages (R.238-44).

Respondent submits

that not only was the cross-examination thorough, but that
it is difficult to imagine any more potentially searching
and effective questioning that could have taken place at
trial.
316

(See People v. Garcia, 65 Ill.App.3d 13, 302 N.E.2d

(1978), where relief was denied when further cross-

examination would have been of no benefit.)
Appellants also contend that they were denied
due process by the trial court's refusal to hold a hearing
on the reliability of the recorded testimony.

Respondent

confesses confusion as to what the appellants are asking
for here.

Respondent suggests that "indicia of reliability"

are those factors identified by the United States Supreme
Court in Green and Roberts, and by this Court in Anderson,
and include:
. • • circumstances closely approximating
those that surround the typical trial.
Porter
was under oath; respondent was represented by
counsel--the same counsel in fact who later
represented him at the trial; respondent
had every opportunity to cross-examine Porter
as to his statement; and the proceedings were
conducted before a judicial tribunal, equipped
to provide a judicial record of the hearings.
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165, 90 S.Ct. 1930,
1938

(1970).

Further, at the Hearing on Motions, defense
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counsel agreed that part of the purpose of that hearing was
to determine the reliability of the testimony (R.508).

It

should also be noted that Judge Leary made every effort
to insure that the tapes were indeed reliable when he allowec
defense counsel to make original substantive objections to
the testimony in the tapes when the tapes were played at the
Hearing on Motions (R.507).

Indeed, the tapes admitted at

trial had been edited to delete objectionable statements.
Appellants further urge that the demeanor, i.e.,
the "sweaty brow" and "seedy appearance," of the witnesses
here was so necessary to the jury's weighing of credibility
as to render its absence fatal to the State's case.
Appellant's cite no authority for this proposition.
Respondent agrees that witness demeanor is important, however,
it is submitted that in no case has the mere absence of
demeanor evidence been deemed dispositive.

Indeed, the fact

that the jury was able to hear the actual testimony and
cross-examination appears to make these tape recordings more
inherently reliable than the dry reading of transcript in
the usual case of this kind. (See State v. Oniskor, supra,
and Gallegos v. Turner, supra, where it appears that this
Court presumed the reliability of prior recorded testimony
and was concerned only with the unavailability question.)
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Respondent suggests that in this case the State
also would have preferred the in-court trial testimony
of the witnesses.

It is certainly reasonable to assume

that the witnesses' absence raised initial doubts and
questions in the jurors' minds as to the basic credibility
of the witnesses.

Further, the State was deprived of

rather grisly, but effectively demonstrative direct
evidence of the nature of the wounds inflicted by
appellants.
None of the cases cited by appellants compel
this Court to find other than that the reliability of
the recorded testimony was sufficiently established to justify
its admission at trial.
For example, State v. Smyth, 286 Or. 293, 593 P.2d
1166 (1979), turned on the issue of unavailability, not the
lack of face-to-face confrontation at trial.

There the

State made absolutely no effort to obtain the voluntary
attendance at trial of a witness who, although living in
a foreign country, was nevertheless only a short distance
away in Canada and probably made the trip

"a dozen times

a year."
Appellants also cite People v. Gibbs, 63
Cal.Rptr. 471 (1968), for the proposition that preliminary
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hearing testimony may be inherently unreliable because
of the difference in the nature of cross-examination.
The missing witness in that case was a police informer
who made a narcotics purchase from the defendant, and
who was facing possible criminal charges himself.

The

most important factor cited by the court in finding that
a denial of confrontation had occurred was that defense
counsel had been appointed only five minutes before the
hearing.

Although counsel did cross-examine the witness,

the court found that the "[b]are existence of an
opportunity for cross-examination • • • " id. at 474, did
not amount to a "complete and adequate opportunity for
cross-examination."

Id. at 476.

Respondent reiterates

that the preliminary hearing cross-examination in
the instant case clearly amounted to an adequate opportunity
fot, and indeed, a thorough exercise of, complete and
adequate cross-examination.
Respondent submits that appellants have failed
to demonstrate that prior recorded testimony from pre-

liminary hearings in general, or from the preliminary hearin!
in this case, is so inherently unreliable as to preclude itS
admission at trial.
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WAS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY.
This Court recently restated the standard of
review it would apply to claims of insufficiency of
the evidence:
It is the exclusive function of the
jury to weigh the evidence and to determine
the credibility of the witnesses, and it is
not within the prerogative of this Court
to substitute its judgment for that of
the fact-finder.
This Court should only
interfere when the evidence is so lacking
and insubstantial that reasonable men
could not possibly have reached a verdict
beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Lamm, Utah,606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980).

That case

cited numerous other cases as standing for the same
proposition.

Id. at 231, fn. 2.

State v. Reddish, Utah,

550 P.2d 728 (1976), held that where the defendant's
version of the story differs from the State's, the court
must assume that the jury believed that version which
supports their verdict.
In the present case, contrary to appellant's
assertions, the jury was presented with far more than a
mere "choice between two far-fetched accounts of an
evening's events."

(App. Brief 35).

Not only was there

the reliably recorded prior testimony of the unavailable
witnesses, but as noted above in the Statement of Facts,
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the equally damaging testimony of the other witnesses
at the general scene of the crime and of the pathologist.
That other testimony not only cast serious doubt on
appellant's self-defense theory, it also strongly
corroborated the victim's accounts of the "evening's events.'
It seems apparent, then, that the evidence here
is not so lacking and insubstantial that the jury must
necessarily have entertained a reasonable doubt that
appellants conunitted the crime.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE APPELLANTS'
INSTRUCTION NO. 23 WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.
Appellants

requested the giving of their

Instruction No. 23, which reads, in pertinent part, thus:
The absence of a testifying witness
who could provide the jury with material
evidence is one factor you may consider
when weighing their credibility. The
jury should view with caution such testimony
if you find that the witness could have made
themselves [sic] available for trial.
Record at 84.

Appellants assert they were denied due

process of law by Judge Leary's refusal to give that
instruction.

They cite as authority for that proposition

the footnote 20 comment in Justice Harlan's concurrence in
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 186, 90 S.Ct. 1930,
1950 (1970).
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Respondent has been unable to locate a holding
by any court that mandates the type of cautionary
instruction that Justice Harlan proposed, and appellants
cite no case authority requiring that type of instruction.
Further, as is apparent from Justice Harlan's language
cited by appellants, the instruction he envisioned was
a rather general caveat to the jury regarding all types
of hearsay evidence.

The language of the instruction

requested here appears to be an inappropriate comment
on the evidence in the case.

It also asks the jury to

make a determination of potential availability, a
preliminary determination properly the responsibility of
the trial judge (see Point I, Part A).
Although respondent was unable to locate any cases
dealing specifically with cautionary instructions as to
hearsay, several cases have dealt with instructions
regarding the credibility of certain categories of
witnesses.

State v. Smith, 88 N.M. 541, 543 P.2d 834

(App. 1975), upheld the trial court's refusal to give a
cautionary instruction to treat "with a great deal of care
and circumspection" the testimony of a witness granted
immunity.

The court stated:

-29-
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(1) there is no requirement that an
instruction be given concerning weighing
the testimony of particular categories of
witnesses; (2) the validity of special
instructions concerning the evaluation of
certain witnesses is doubtful; and (3) the
basic instruction on credibility of
witnesses sufficiently instructs on
witness evaluation.
543 P.2d at 840.

The general propriety of cautionary

instructions as to witness credibility is a matter for
the trial court.

State v. Boetger, 96 Idaho 535, 531

P.2d 1180 (1975); Land v. People, 171 Colo. 114, 465
P.2d 124 (1970); State v. Huff_, 76 Wash.2d 577, 458
P.2d 180 (1969).
Respondent submits that Judge Leary sufficiently
instructed the jury as to their exclusive duty to judge
the credibility of the witnesses in the preliminary instructions (R.91) and in the final instructions (R.100, 101).
Further, the jury was clearly instructed on the defense
theory of the case (R.108,109).

Taken as a whole, the

instructions given in this case adequately and
appropriately informed the jury of the applicable law
and their duty under that law (R.88-115).
Respondent submits that appellants' claim of
abuse of discretion is sirnply without merit.
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CONCLUSION
Admission at trial of the recorded preliminary
hearing testimony of the victims did not deny appellants'
right to confrontation because the witnesses were constitutionally unavailable and their testimony was obtained
under circumstances bearing sufficient indicia of
reliability.

The evidence presented at trial was sufficient

to support the jury verdict.

The trial court committed no

abuse of discretion in refusing appellants' requested
instruction.
For the foregoing reasons, respondent
respectfully prays for an order from this Court upholding
the verdicts of the jury and affirming the judgments and
sentences entered in the court below.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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